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Abstract
A traditional assumption in game theory is that players are opaque to one
another—if a player changes strategies, then this change in strategies does
not affect the choice of other players’ strategies. In many situations this is an
unrealistic assumption. We develop a framework for reasoning about games
where the players may be translucent to one another; in particular, a player
may believe that if she were to change strategies, then the other player would
also change strategies. Translucent players may achieve significantly more
efficient outcomes than opaque ones.
Our main result is a characterization of strategies consistent with appro-
priate analogues of common belief of rationality. Common Counterfactual
Belief of Rationality (CCBR) holds if (1) everyone is rational, (2) everyone
counterfactually believes that everyone else is rational (i.e., all players i be-
lieve that everyone else would still be rational even if i were to switch strate-
gies), (3) everyone counterfactually believes that everyone else is rational,
and counterfactually believes that everyone else is rational, and so on. CCBR
characterizes the set of strategies surviving iterated removal of minimax dom-
inated strategies, where a strategy σ for player i is minimax dominated by σ′
if the worst-case payoff for i using σ′ is better than the best possible payoff
using σ.
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1 Introduction
Two large firms 1 and 2 need to decide whether to cooperate (C) or sue (S) the
other firm. Suing the other firm always has a small positive reward, but being
sued induces a high penalty p; more precisely, u(C,C) = (0, 0);u(C,S) =
(−p, r);u(S,C) = (r,−p), u(S, S) = (r − p, r − p). In other words, we are
considering an instance of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
But there is a catch. Before acting, each firms needs to discuss their decision
with its board. Although these discussions are held behind closed doors, there is
always the possibility of the decision being “leaked”; as a consequence, the other
company may change its course of action. Furthermore, both companies are aware
of this fact. In other words, the players are translucent to one another.
In such a scenario, it may well be rational for both companies to cooperate. For
instance, consider the following situation.
• Firm i believes that its action is leaked to firm 2− i with probability ǫ.
• Firm i believes that if the other firm 2 − i finds out that i is defecting, then
2− i will also defect.
• Finally, pǫ > r (i.e., the penalty for being sued is significantly higher than
the reward of suing the other company).
Neither firm defects, since defection is noticed by the other firm with probability
ǫ, which (according to their beliefs) leads to a harsh punishment. Thus, the possi-
bility of the players’ actions being leaked to the other player allows the players to
significantly improve social welfare in equilibrium. (This suggests that it may be
mutually beneficial for two countries to spy on each other!)
Even if the Prisoner’s dilemma is not played by corporations but by individuals,
each player may believe that if he chooses to defect, his “guilt” over defecting may
be visible to the other player. (Indeed, facial and bodily cues such as increased
pupil size are often associated with deception; see e.g., [Ekman and Friesen 1969].)
Thus, again, the players may choose to cooperate out of fear that if they defect, the
other player may detect it and act on it.
Our goal is to capture this type of reasoning formally. We take a Bayesian
approach: Each player has a (subjective) probability distribution (describing the
player’s beliefs) over the states of the world. Traditionally, a player i is said to
be rational in a state ω if the strategy σi that i plays at ω is a best response to
the strategy profile µ−i of the other players induced by i’s beliefs in ω;1 that is,
1Formally, we assume that i has a distribution on states, and at each state, a pure strategy profile
is played; the distribution on states clearly induces a distribution on strategy profiles for the players
other than i, which we denote µ−i.
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ui(σi, µ−i) ≥ ui(σ
′
i, µ−i) for all alternative strategies σ′i for i. In our setting,
things are more subtle. Player i may believe that if she were to switch strategies
from σi to σ′i, then players other than imight also switch strategies. We capture this
using counterfactuals [Lewis 1973; Stalnaker 1968].2 Associated with each state
of the world ω, each player i, and f(ω, i, σ′i) where player i plays σ′i. Note that if i
changes strategies, then this change in strategies may start a chain reaction, leading
to further changes. We can think of f(ω, i, σ′i) as the steady-state outcome of this
process: the state that would result if i switched strategies to σ′i. Let µf(ω,i,σ′i) be
the distribution on strategy profiles of −i (the players other than i) induced by i’s
beliefs at ω about the steady-state outcome of this process. We say that i is rational
at a state ω where i plays σi and has beliefs µi if ui(σi, µ−i) ≥ ui(σ′i, µf(ω,i,σ′i))
for every alternative strategy σ′i for i. Note that we have required the closest-state
function to be deterministic, returning a unique state, rather than a distribution over
states. While this may seem incompatible with the motivating scenario, it does not
seem so implausible in our context that, by taking a rich enough representation
of states, we can assume that a state contains enough information about players
to resolve uncertainty about what strategies they would use if one player were to
switch strategies.
We are interested in considering analogues to rationalizability in a setting with
translucent players, and providing epistemic characterizations of them. To do that,
we need some definitions. We say that a player i counterfactually believes ϕ at ω
if i believes ϕ holds even if i were to switch strategies. Common Counterfactual
Belief of Rationality (CCBR) holds if (1) everyone is rational, (2) everyone coun-
terfactually believes that everyone else is rational (i.e., all players i believe that
everyone else would still be still rational even if i were to switch strategies), (3) ev-
eryone counterfactually believes that everyone else is rational, and counterfactually
believes that everyone else is rational, and so on.
Our main result is a characterization of strategies consistent with CCBR. Roughly
2A different, more direct, approach for capturing our original motivating example would be to
consider and analyze an extensive-form variantG′ of the original normal-form gameG that explicitly
models the “leakage” of players’ actions in G, allows the player to react to these leakage signals by
choosing a new action in G, which again may be leaked and the players may react to, and so on.
Doing this is subtle. We would need to model how players respond to receiving leaked information,
and to believing that there was a change in plan even if information wasn’t leaked. To make matters
worse, it’s not clear what it would mean that a player is “intending” to perform an action a if players
can revise what they do as the result of a leak. Does it mean that a player will do a if no information
is leaked to him? What if no information is leaked, but he believes that the other side is planning
to change their plans in any case? In addition, modeling the game in this way would require a
distribution over leakage signals to be exogenously given (as part of the description of the game G′).
Moreover, player strategies would have to be infinite objects, since there is no bound on the sequence
of leaks and responses to leaks. In contrast, using counterfactuals, we can directly reason about the
original (finite) game G.
3
speaking, these results can be summarized as follows:
• If the closest-state function respects “unilateral deviations”—when i switches
strategies, the strategies and beliefs of players other than i remain the same—
then CCBR characterizes the set of rationalizable strategies.
• If the closest-state function can be arbitrary, CCBR characterizes the set of
strategies that survive iterated removal of minimax dominated strategies: a
strategy σi is minimax dominated for i if there exists a strategy σ′i for i
such that minµ′
−i
ui(σ
′
i, µ
′
−i) > maxµ−i ui(σi, µ−i); that is, ui(σ′i, µ′−i) >
ui(σi, µ−i) no matter what the strategy profiles µ−i and µ′−i are.
We also consider analogues of Nash equilibrium in our setting, and show that in-
dividually rational strategy profiles that survive iterated removal of minimax dom-
inated strategies characterize such equilibria.
Note that in our approach, each player i has a belief about how the other play-
ers’ strategies would change if iwere to change strategies, but we do not require i to
explicitly specify how he would respond to other people changing strategies. The
latter approach, of having each player specify how she responds to her opponents’
actions, goes back to von Neumann and Morgenstern [von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947,
pp. 105–106]:
Indeed, the rules of the game Γ prescribe that each player must make
his choice (his personal move) in ignorance of the outcome of the
choice of his adversary. It is nevertheless conceivable that one of the
players, say 2, ” finds out”; i.e., has somehow acquired the knowl-
edge as to what his adversary’s strategy is. The basis for this knowl-
edge does not concern us; it may (but need not) be experience from
previous plays.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s analysis corresponds to a single round of re-
moval of minimax dominated strategies. This approach was further explored and
formalized by by Howard [1971] in the 1960s. In Howard’s approach, players
pick a “meta-strategy” that takes as input the strategy of other players. It led to
complex formalisms involving infinite hierarchies of meta-strategies: at the lowest
level, each player specifies a strategy in the original game; at level k, each player
specifies a “response rule” (i.e., a meta-strategy) to other players’ (k − 1)-level
response rules. Such hierarchical structures have not proven useful when dealing
with applications. Since we do not require players to specify reaction rules, we
avoid the complexities of this approach.
Program equilibria [Tennenholz 2004] and conditional commitments [Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet 2010]
provide a different approach to avoiding infinite hierarchies. Roughly speaking,
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each player i simply specifies a program Πi; player i’s action is determined by
running i’s program on input the (description of) the programs of the other play-
ers; that is, i′ action is given by Πi(Π−i). Tennenholtz [2004] and Kalai et al.
[2010] show that every (correlated) individually rational outcome can be sustained
in a program equilibrium. Their model, however, assumes that player’s programs
(which should be interpreted as their “plan of action”) are commonly known to
all players. We dispense with this assumption. It is also not clear how to define
common belief of rationality in their model; the study of program equilibria and
conditional commitments has considered only analogues of Nash equilibrium.
Perhaps most closely related to our model is a paper by Spohn [2003] that
studies a generalization of Nash equilibrium called dependency equilibria, where
players’ conjectures are described as “conditional probabilities”: for each action
a1 of player 1, player 1 may have a different belief about the action of player 2.
Independently of our work, Salcedo [2013], defines a notion of conjectural ratio-
nalizability that replaces beliefs (over actions) by conjectures described as condi-
tional probabilities, as in [Spohn 2003]. Salcedo also defines a notion of minimax
domination (which he calls absolute domination), and characterizes conjectural
rationalizability in terms of strategies surviving iterated deletion of minimax dom-
inated strategies.
Counterfactuals have been explored in a game-theoretic setting; see, for exam-
ple, [Aumann 1995; Halpern 1999; Samet 1996; Stalnaker 1996; Zambrano 2004].
However, all these papers considered only structures where, in the closest state
where i changes strategies, all other players’ strategies remain the same; thus, these
approaches are not applicable in our context.
2 Counterfactual Structures
Given a game Γ, let Σi(Γ) denote player i’s pure strategies in Γ (we occasionally
omit the parenthetical Γ if it is clear from context or irrelevant).
To reason about the game Γ, we consider a class of Kripke structures corre-
sponding to Γ. For simplicity, we here focus on finite structures. A finite probabil-
ity structure M appropriate for Γ is a tuple (Ω, s,PR1, . . . ,PRn), where Ω is a
finite set of states; s associates with each state ω ∈ Ω a pure strategy profile s(ω) in
the game Γ; and, for each player i, PRi is a probability assignment that associates
with each state ω ∈ Ω a probability distribution PRi(ω) on Ω, such that
1. PRi(ω)([[si(ω)]]M ) = 1, where for each strategy σi for player i, [[σi]]M =
{ω : si(ω) = σi}, where si(ω) denotes player i’s strategy in the strategy
profile s(ω);
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2. PRi(ω)([[PRi(ω), i]]M ) = 1, where for each probability measure π and
player i, [[π, i]]M = {ω : PRi(ω) = π}.
These assumptions say that player i assigns probability 1 to his actual strategy and
beliefs.
To deal with counterfactuals, we augment probability structures with a “closest-
state” function f that associates with each state ω, player i, and strategy σ′i, a state
f(ω, i, σi) where player i plays σ′; if σ′ is already played in ω, then the closest state
to ω where σ′ is played is ω itself. Formally, a finite counterfactual structure M ap-
propriate for Γ is a tuple (Ω, s, f,PR1, . . . ,PRn), where (Ω, s,PR1, . . . ,PRn)
is a probability structure appropriate for Γ and f is a “closest-state” function. We
require that if f(ω, i, σ′i) = ω′, then
1. si(ω′) = σ′;
2. if σ′i = si(ω), then ω′ = ω.
Given a probability assignment PRi for player i, we define i’s counterfactual
belief at state ω (“what i believes would happen if he switched to σ′i at ω) as
PRci,σ′i
(ω)(ω′) =
∑
{ω′′∈Ω:f(ω′′,i,σ′i)=ω
′}
PRi(ω)(ω
′′).
Note that the conditions above imply that each player i knows what strategy he
would play if he were to switch; that is, PRci,σ′i(ω)([[σ
′
i]]M ) = 1.
Let Supp(π) denote the support of the probability measure π. Note that Supp(PRci,σ′i(ω)) =
{f(ω′, i, σ′i) : ω
′ ∈ Supp(PRi(ω)}. Moreover, it is almost immediate from the
definition that if PRi(ω) = PRi(ω′), then PRci,σ′i(ω) = PR
c
i,σ′i
(ω′) for all strate-
gies σ′i for player i. But it does not in general follow that i knows his counterfac-
tual beliefs at ω, that is, it may not be the case that for all strategies σ′i for player i,
PRci,σ′i
(ω)([[PRci,σ′i
(ω), i]]M ) = 1. Suppose that we think of a state as represent-
ing each player’s ex ante view of the game. The fact that player si(ω) = σi should
then be interpreted as “i intends to play σi at state ω.” With this view, suppose
that ω is a state where si(ω) is a conservative strategy, while σ′i is a rather reckless
strategy. It seems reasonable to expect that i’s subjective beliefs regarding the like-
lihood of various outcomes may depend in part on whether he is in a conservative
or reckless frame of mind. We can think of PRci,σ′i(ω)(ω
′) as the probability that
i ascribes, at state ω, to ω′ being the outcome of i switching to strategy σ′i; thus,
PRci,σ′i
(ω)(ω′) represents i’s evaluation of the likelihood of ω′ when he is in a con-
servative frame of mind. This may not be the evaluation that i uses in states in the
support PRci,σ′i(ω); at all these states, i is in a “reckless” frame of mind. Moreover,
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there may not be a unique reckless frame of mind, so that i may not have the same
beliefs at all the states in the support of PRci,σ′i(ω).
M is a strongly appropriate counterfactual structure if it is an appropriate
counterfactual structure and, at every state ω, every player i knows his counterfac-
tual beliefs. As the example above suggests, strong appropriateness is a nontrivial
requirement. As we shall see, however, our characterization results hold in both
appropriate and strongly appropriate counterfactual structures.
Note that even in strongly appropriate counterfactually structures, we may not
have PRi(f(ω, i, σ′i)) = PRci,σ′i(ω). We do have PRi(f(ω, i, σ
′
i)) = PR
c
i,σ′i
(ω)
in strongly appropriate counterfactual structures if f(ω, i, σ′i) is in the support of
PRci,σ′i
(ω) (which will certainly be the case if ω is in the support of PRi(ω)).
To see why we may not want to have PRi(f(ω, i, σ′i)) = PRci,σ′i(ω) in general,
even in strongly appropriate counterfactual structures, consider the example above
again. Suppose that, in state ω, although i does not realize it, he has been given a
drug that affects how he evaluates the state. He thus ascribes probability 0 to ω. In
f(ω, i, σ′i) he has also been given the drug, and the drug in particular affects how
he evaluates outcomes. Thus, i’s beliefs in the state f(ω, i, σ′i) are quite different
from his beliefs in all states in the support of PRci,σ′i(ω).
2.1 Logics for Counterfactual Games
Let Ł(Γ) be the language where we start with true and the primitive proposition
RAT i and play i(σi) for σi ∈ Σi(Γ), and close off under the modal operators Bi
(player i believes) and B∗i (player i counterfactually believes) for i = 1, . . . , n,
CB (common belief), and CB∗ (common counterfactual belief), conjunction, and
negation. We think of Biϕ as saying that “i believes ϕ holds with probability 1”
and B∗i ϕ as saying “i believes that ϕ holds with probability 1, even if i were to
switch strategies”.
Let Ł0 be defined exactly like Ł except that we exclude the “counterfactual”
modal operators B∗ and CB∗. We first define semantics for Ł0 using probability
structures (without counterfactuals). We define the notion of a formula ϕ being
true at a state ω in a probability structure M (written (M,w) |= ϕ) in the standard
way, by induction on the structure of ϕ, as follows:
• (M,ω) |= true (so true is vacuously true).
• (M,ω) |= play i(σi) iff σi = si(ω).
• (M,ω) |= ¬ϕ iff (M,ω) 6|= ϕ.
• (M,ω) |= ϕ ∧ ϕ′ iff (M,ω) |= ϕ and (M,ω) |= ϕ′.
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• (M,ω) |= Biϕ iff PRi(ω)([[ϕ]]M ) = 1, where [[ϕ]]M = {ω : (M,ω) |= ϕ}.
• (M,ω) |= RAT i iff si(ω) is a best response given player i’s beliefs regard-
ing the strategies of other players induced by PRi.
• Let EBϕ (“everyone believes ϕ”) be an abbreviation of B1ϕ ∧ . . . ∧ Bnϕ;
and define EBkϕ for all k inductively, by taking EB1ϕ to be EBϕ and
EBk+1ϕ to be EB(EBkϕ).
• (M,ω) |= CBϕ iff (M,ω) |= EBkϕ for all k ≥ 1.
Semantics for Ł0 in counterfactual structures is defined in an identical way, except
that we redefine RAT i to take into account the fact that player i’s beliefs about the
strategies of players −i may change if i changes strategies.
• (M,ω) |= RAT i iff for every strategy σ′i for player i,∑
ω′∈Ω
PRi(ω)(ω
′)ui(si(ω), s−i(ω
′)) ≥
∑
ω′∈Ω
PRci,σ′i
(ω)(ω′)ui(σ
′
i, s−i(ω
′)).
The condition above is equivalent to requiring that∑
ω′∈Ω
PRi(ω)(ω
′)ui(si(ω), s−i(ω
′)) ≥
∑
ω′∈Ω
PRi(ω)(ω
′)ui(σ
′
i, s−i(f(ω
′, i, σ′i))).
Note that, in general, this condition is different from requiring that si(ω) is a best
response given player i’s beliefs regarding the strategies of other players induced
by PRi.
To give the semantics for Ł in counterfactual structures, we now also need to
define the semantics of B∗i and CB∗:
• (M,ω) |= B∗i ϕ iff for all strategies σ′i ∈ Σi(Γ), PRci,σ′i(ω)([[ϕ]]M ) = 1.
• (M,ω) |= CB∗ϕ iff (M,ω) |= (EB∗)kϕ for all k ≥ 1.
It is easy to see that, like Bi, B∗i depends only on i’s beliefs; as we observed above,
if PRi(ω) = PRi(ω′), then PRci,σ′i(ω) = PR
c
i,σ′i
(ω′) for all σ′i, so (M,ω) |=
B∗i ϕ iff (M,ω′) |= B∗i ϕ. It immediately follows that B∗i ϕ⇒ BiB∗i ϕ is valid (i.e.,
true at all states in all structures).
The following abbreviations will be useful in the sequel. Let RAT be an
abbreviation for RAT 1 ∧ . . . ∧ RATn, and let play(~σ) be an abbreviation for
play1(σ1) ∧ . . . ∧ playn(σn).
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2.2 Common Counterfactual Belief of Rationality
We are interested in analyzing strategies being played at states where (1) everyone
is rational, (2) everyone counterfactually believes that everyone else is rational
(i.e., for every player i, i believes that everyone else would still be rational even if i
were to switch strategies), (3) everyone counterfactually believes that everyone else
is rational, and counterfactually believes that everyone else is rational, and so on.
For each player i, define the formulas SRAT ki (player i is strongly k-level rational)
inductively, by taking SRAT 0i to be true and SRAT
k+1
i to be an abbreviation of
RAT i ∧B
∗
i (∧j 6=iSRAT
k
j ).
Let SRAT k be an abbreviation of ∧nj=1SRAT kj .
Define CCBR (common counterfactual belief of rationality) as follows:
• (M,ω) |= CCBR iff (M,ω) |= SRAT kϕ for all k ≥ 1.
Note that it is critical in the definition of SRAT ki that we require only that player
i counterfactually believes that everyone else (i.e., the players other than i) are
rational, and believe that everyone else is rational, and so on. Player i has no reason
to believe that his own strategy would be rational if he were to switch strategies;
indeed, B∗i RAT i can hold only if every strategy for player i is rational with respect
to i’s beliefs. This is why we do not define CCBR as CB∗RAT .3
We also consider the consequence of just common belief of rationality in our
setting. Define WRAT ki (player i is weakly k-level rational) just as SRAT ki ,
except that B∗i is replaced by Bi. An easy induction on k shows that WRAT k+1
implies WRAT k and that WRAT k implies Bi(WRAT k).4 It follows that we
could have equivalently defined WRAT k+1i as
RAT i ∧Bi(∧
n
j=1WRAT
k
j ).
Thus, WRAT k+1 is equivalent to RAT ∧ EB(WRAT k). As a consequence we
have the following:
Proposition 2.1: (M,ω) |= CB(RAT ) iff (M,ω) |=WRAT k for all k ≥ 0.
3Interestingly, Samet [1996] essentially considers an analogue of CB∗RAT . This works in his
setting since he is considering only events in the past, not events in the future.
4We can also show that SRAT k+1 implies SRAT k, but it is not the case that SRAT ki implies
B∗i SRAT
k
i , since RAT does not imply B∗i RAT .
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3 Characterizing Common Counterfactual Belief of Ra-
tionality
To put our result into context, we first restate the characterizations of rationaliz-
ability given by Tan and Werlang [1988] and Brandenburger and Dekel [1987] in
our language. We first recall Pearce’s [1984] definition of rationalizability.
Definition 3.1: A strategy σi for player i is rationalizable if, for each player j,
there is a set Zj ⊆ Σj(Γ) and, for each strategy σ′j ∈ Zj , a probability measure
µσ′j on Σ−j(Γ) whose support is a subset of Z−j such that
• σi ∈ Zi; and
• for strategy σ′j ∈ Zj , strategy σ′j is a best response to (the beliefs) µσ′j .
A strategy profile ~σ is rationalizable if every strategy σi in the profile is rationaliz-
able.
Theorem 3.2: [Brandenburger and Dekel 1987; Tan and Werlang 1988] ~σ is ra-
tionalizable in a game Γ iff there exists a finite probability structure M that is
appropriate for Γ and a state ω such that (M,ω) |= play(~σ) ∧ CB(RAT ).
We now consider counterfactual structures. We here provide a condition on the
closest-state function under which common (counterfactual) belief of rationality
characterizes rationalizable strategies.
3.1 Counterfactual Structures Respecting Unilateral Deviations
Let M = (Ω, f,PR1, . . . ,PRn) be a finite counterfactual structure that is appro-
priate for Γ. M respects unilateral deviations if, for every state ω ∈ Ω, player i,
and strategy σ′i for player i, s−i(f(ω, i, σ′)) = s−i(ω) and PR−i(f(ω, i, σ′)) =
PR−i(ω); that is, in the closest state to ω where player i switches strategies, ev-
erybody else’s strategy and beliefs remain same.
Recall that Ł0 is defined exactly like Ł except that we exclude the “counter-
factual” modal operators B∗ and CB∗. The following theorem shows that for
formulas in Ł0, counterfactual structures respecting unilateral deviations behave
just as (standard) probability structures.
Theorem 3.3: For every ϕ ∈ Ł0, there exists a finite probability structure M
appropriate for Γ and a state ω such that (M,ω) |= ϕ iff there exists a finite
counterfactual structure M ′ (strongly) appropriate for Γ that respects unilateral
deviations, and a state ω′ such that (M ′, ω′) |= ϕ.
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Proof: For the “if” direction, let M ′ = (Ω, f,PR1, . . . ,PRn) be a finite coun-
terfactual structure that is counterfactually appropriate for Γ (but not necessarily
strongly counterfactually appropriate) and respects unilateral deviations. Define
M = (Ω,PR1, . . . ,PRn). Clearly M is a finite probability structure appropriate
for Γ; it follows by a straightforward induction on the length of ϕ that (M ′, ω) |= ϕ
iff (M,ω) |= ϕ.
For the “only-if” direction, let M = (Ω,PR1, . . . ,PRn) be a finite probabil-
ity structure, and let ω ∈ Ω be a state such that (M,ω) |= ϕ. We assume without
loss of generality that for each strategy profile ~σ′ there exists some state ω~σ′ ∈ Ω
such that s(ω~σ′) = ~σ′ and for each player i, PRi(ω~σ′)(ω~σ′) = 1. (If such a state
does not exist, we can always add it.)
We define a finite counterfactual structure M ′ = (Ω′, f ′,PR′1, . . . ,PR′n) as
follows:
• Ω′ = {(~σ′, ω′) : ~σ′ ∈ Σ(Γ), ω′ ∈ Ω};
• s′(~σ′, ω′) = ~σ′;
• f((~σ′, ω′), i, σ′′i ) = ((σ
′′
i , σ
′
−i), ω
′)
• PR′i is defined as follows.
– PR′i(s(ω
′), ω′)(s(ω′′), ω′′) = PRi(ω
′)(ω′′)
– If ~σ′ 6= s(ω′), PR′i(~σ′, ω′)(~σ′, ω~σ′) = 1.
It follows by construction that M ′ is strongly appropriate for Γ and respects unilat-
eral deviations. Furthermore, it follows by an easy induction on the length of the
formula ϕ′ that for every state ω ∈ Ω, (M,ω) |= ϕ′ iff (M ′, (s(ω), ω)) |= ϕ′.
We can now use Theorem 3.3 together with the standard characterization of
common belief of rationality (Theorem 3.2) to characterize both common belief of
rationality and common counterfactual belief of rationality.
Theorem 3.4: The following are equivalent:
(a) ~σ is rationalizable in Γ;
(b) there exists a finite counterfactual structure M that is appropriate for Γ and
respects unilateral deviations, and a state ω such that (M,ω) |= play(~σ)∧ni=1
WRAT ki for all k ≥ 0;
(c) there exists a finite counterfactual structure M that is strongly appropriate
for Γ and respects unilateral deviations and a state ω such that (M,ω) |=
play(~σ) ∧ni=1 WRAT
k
i for all k ≥ 0;
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(d) there exists a finite counterfactual structure M that is appropriate for Γ and
respects unilateral deviations and a state ω such that (M,ω) |= play(~σ)∧ni=1
SRAT ki for all k ≥ 0;
(e) there exists a finite counterfactual structure M that is strongly appropriate
for Γ and respects unilateral deviations and a state ω such that (M,ω) |=
play(~σ) ∧ni=1 SRAT
k
i for all k ≥ 0.
Proof: The equivalence of (a), (b), and (c) is immediate from Theorem 3.2, Theo-
rem 3.3, and Proposition 2.1. We now prove the equivalence of (b) and (d). Con-
sider an counterfactual structure M that is appropriate for Γ and respects unilateral
deviations. The result follows immediately once we show that for all states ω and
all i ≥ 0, (M,ω) |= WRAT ki iff (M,ω) |= SRAT ki . An easy induction on
k shows that SRAT ki ⇒ WRAT ki is valid in all counterfactual structures, not
just ones that respect unilateral deviations. We prove the converse in structures
that respect unilateral deviations by induction on k. The base case holds triv-
ially. For the induction step, suppose that (M,ω) |= WRAT ki ; that is, (M,ω) |=
RAT i ∧ Bi(∧j 6=iWRAT
k−1
j ). Thus, for all ω′ ∈ Supp(PRi(ω)), we have that
(M,ω′) |= ∧j 6=iWRAT
k−1
j . Thus, by the induction hypothesis, (M,ω′) |=
∧j 6=iSRAT
k−1
j . Since, as we have observed, the truth of a formula of the form
B∗jϕ at a state ω
′′ depends only on j’s beliefs at ω′′ and the truth of RAT j de-
pends only on j’s strategy and beliefs at ω′′, it easily follows that, if j has the same
beliefs and plays the same strategy at ω1 and ω2, then (M,ω1) |= SRAT k−1j iff
(M,ω2) |= SRAT
k−1
j . Since (M,ω′) |= ∧j 6=iSRAT
k−1
j andM respect unilateral
deviations, for all strategies σ′i, it follows that (M,f(ω′, i, σ′i)) |= ∧j 6=iSRAT
k−1
j .
Thus, (M,ω) |= RAT i ∧ B∗i (∧j 6=iSRAT
k−1
j ), as desired. The argument that
(c) is equivalent to (e) is identical; we just need to consider strongly appropriate
counterfactual structures rather than just appropriate counterfactual structures.
Remark 3.5: Note that, in the proofs of Theorems 3.3 and 3.4, a weaker condition
on the counterfactual structure would suffice, namely, that we restrict to counter-
factual structures where, for every state ω ∈ Ω, player i, and strategy σ′i for player
i, the projection of PRci,σ′i(ω) onto strategies and beliefs of players −i is equal to
the projection of PRi(ω) onto strategies and beliefs of players −i. That is, every
player’s counterfactual beliefs regarding other players’ strategies and beliefs are
the same as the player’s actual beliefs.
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3.2 Iterated Minimax Domination
We now characterize common counterfactual belief of rationality without putting
any restrictions on the counterfactual structures (other than them being appropriate,
or strongly appropriate). Our characterization is based on ideas that come from the
characterization of rationalizability. It is well known that rationalizability can be
characterized in terms of an iterated deletion procedure, where at each stage, a
strategy σ for player i is deleted if there are no beliefs that i could have about
the undeleted strategies for the players other than i that would make σ rational
[Pearce 1984]. Thus, there is a deletion procedure that, when applied repeatedly,
results in only the rationalizable strategies, that is, the strategies that are played
in states where there is common belief of rationality, being left undeleted. We
now show that there is an analogous way of characterizing common counterfactual
belief of rationality.
The key to our characterization is the notion of minimax dominated strategies.
Definition 3.6: Strategy σi for player i in game Γ is minimax dominated with
respect to Σ′−i ⊆ Σ−i(Γ) iff there exists a strategy σ′i ∈ Σi(Γ) such that
min
τ−i∈Σ′−i
ui(σ
′
i, τ−i) > max
τ−i∈Σ′−i
ui(σi, τ−i).
In other words, player i’s strategy σ is minimax dominated with respect to Σ′−i
iff there exists a strategy σ′ such that the worst-case payoff for player i if he uses σ′
is strictly better than his best-case payoff if he uses σ, given that the other players
are restricted to using a strategy in Σ′−i.
In the standard setting, if a strategy σi for player i is dominated by σ′i then we
would expect that a rational player will never player σi, because σ′i is a strictly
better choice. As is well known, if σi is dominated by σ′i, then there are no beliefs
that i could have regarding the strategies used by the other players according to
which σi is a best response [Pearce 1984]. This is no longer the case in our setting.
For example, in the standard setting, cooperation is dominated by defection in
Prisoner’s Dilemma. But in our setting, suppose that player 1 believes that if he
cooperates, then the other player will cooperate, while if he defects, then the other
player will defect. Then cooperation is not dominated by defection.
So when can we guarantee that playing a strategy is irrational in our setting?
This is the case only if the strategy is minimax dominated. If σi is minimax domi-
nated by σ′i, there are no counterfactual beliefs that i could have that would justify
playing σi. Conversely, if σi is not minimax dominated by any strategy, then there
are beliefs and counterfactual beliefs that i could have that would justify playing
13
σi. Specifically, i could believe that the players in −i are playing the strategy pro-
file that gives i the best possible utility when he plays σi, and that if he switches to
another strategy σ′i, the other players will play the strategy profile that gives i the
worst possible utility given that he is playing σ′i.
Note that we consider only domination by pure strategies. It is easy to con-
struct examples of strategies that are not minimax dominated by any pure strategy,
but are minimax dominated by a mixed strategy. Our characterization works only if
we restrict to domination by pure strategies. The characterization, just as with the
characterization of rationalizability, involves iterated deletion, but now we do not
delete dominated strategies in the standard sense, but minimax dominated strate-
gies.
Definition 3.7: DefineNSDkj (Γ) inductively: let NSD0j(Γ) = Σj and let NSDk+1j (Γ)
consist of the strategies in NSDkj (Γ) not minimax dominated with respect to NSDk−j(Γ).
Strategy σ survives k rounds of iterated deletion of minimax dominated strategies
for player i if σ ∈ NSDki (Γ). Strategy σ for player i survives iterated deletion of
minimax dominated strategies if it survives k rounds of iterated deletion of strongly
dominated for all k, that is, if σ ∈ NSD∞i (Γ) = ∩kNSDki (Γ).
In the deletion procedure above, at each step we remove all strategies that
are minimax dominated; that is we perform a “maximal” deletion at each step.
As we now show, the set of strategies that survives iterated deletion is actually
independent of the deletion order.
Let S0, . . . , Sm be sets of strategy profiles. ~S = (S0, S1, . . . , Sm) is a ter-
minating deletion sequence for Γ if, for j = 0, . . . ,m − 1, Sj+1 ⊂ Sj (note
that we use ⊂ to mean proper subset) and all players i, Sj+1i contains all strate-
gies for player i not minimax dominated with respect to Sj−i (but may also contain
some strategies that are minimax dominated), and Smi does not contain any strate-
gies that are minimax dominated with respect to Sm−i. A set T of strategy profiles
has ambiguous terminating sets if there exist two terminating deletion sequences
~S = (T, S1, . . . , Sm), ~S
′ = (T, S′1, . . . , S
′
m′) such that Sm 6= S′m′ ; otherwise, we
say that T has a unique terminating set.
Proposition 3.8: No (finite) set of strategy profiles has ambiguous terminating sets.
Proof: Let T be a set of strategy profiles of least cardinality that has ambiguous
terminating deletion sequences ~S = (T, S1, . . . , Sm) and ~S′ = (T, S′1, . . . , S′m′),
where Sm 6= S′m′ . Let T ′ be the set of strategies that are not minimax dominated
with respect to T . Clearly T ′ 6= ∅ and, by definition, T ′ ⊆ S1 ∩ S′1. Since T ′,
S1, and S′1 all have cardinality less than that of T , they must all have unique ter-
minating sets; moreover, the terminating sets must be the same. For consider a
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terminating deletion sequence starting at T ′. We can get a terminating deletion se-
quence starting at S1 by just appending this sequence to S1 (or taking this sequence
itself, if S1 = T ′). We can similarly get a terminating deletion sequence starting
at S′1. Since all these terminating deletion sequences have the same final element,
this must be the unique terminating set. But (S1, . . . , Sm) and (S′1, . . . , S′m′) are
terminating deletion sequences with Sm 6= S′m′ , a contradiction.
Corollary 3.9: The set of strategies that survives iterated deletion of minimax dom-
inated strategies is independent of the deletion order.
Remark 3.10: Note that in the definition of NSDki (Γ), we remove all strategies
that are dominated by some strategy in Σi(Γ), not just those dominated by some
strategy in NSDk−1i (Γ). Nevertheless, the definition would be equivalent even if
we had considered only dominating strategies in NSDk−1i (Γ). For suppose not. Let
k be the smallest integer such that there exists some strategy σi ∈ NSDk−1i (Γ) that
is minimax dominated by a strategy σ′i /∈ NSD
k−1
i (Γ), but there is no strategy in
NSDk−1i (Γ) that dominates σi. That is, σ′i was deleted in some previous iteration.
Then there exists a sequence of strategies σ0i , . . . , σ
q
i and indices k0 < k1 < . . . <
kq = k − 1 such that σ0i = σ′i, σ
j
i ∈ NSD
kj
i (Γ), and for all 0 ≤ j < q, σ
j
i is
minimax dominated by σj+1i with respect to NSD
kj−1
i (Γ). Since NSD
k−2(Γ) ⊆
NSDj(Γ) for j ≤ k− 2, an easy induction on j shows that σqi minimax dominates
σq−j with respect to NSDk−2 for all 0 < j ≤ q. In particular, σq minimax
dominates σ0i = σ′ with respect to NSDk−2.
The following example shows that iteration has bite: there exist a 2-player
game where each player has k actions and k − 1 rounds of iterations are needed.
Example 3.11: Consider a two-player game, where both players announce a value
between 1 and k. Both players receive in utility the smallest of the values an-
nounced; additionally, the player who announces the larger value get a reward of
p = 0.5.5 That is, u(x, y) = (y + p, y) if x > y, (x, x+ p) if y > x, and (x, x) if
x = y. In the first step of the deletion process, 1 is deleted for both players; playing
1 can yield a max utility of 1, whereas the minimum utility of any other action is
1.5. Once 1 is deleted, 2 is deleted for both players: 2 can yield a max utility of
2, and the min utility of any other action (once 1 is deleted) is 2.5. Continuing this
process, we see that only (k, k) survives.
5This game can be viewed a a reverse variant of the Traveler’s dilemma [Basu 1994], where the
player who announces the smaller value gets the reward.
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3.3 Characterizing Iterated Minimax Domination
We now show that strategies surviving iterated removal of minimax dominated
strategies characterize the set of strategies consistent with common counterfactual
belief of rationality in (strongly) appropriate counterfactual structures. As a first
step, we define a “minimax” analogue of rationalizability.
Definition 3.12: A strategy profile ~σ in game Γ is minimax rationalizable if, for
each player i, there is a set Zi ⊆ Σi(Γ) such that
• σi ∈ Zi;
• for every strategy σ′i ∈ Zi and strategy σ′′i ∈ Σi(Γ),
max
τ−i∈Z−i
ui(σ
′
i, τ−i) ≥ min
τ−i∈Z−i
ui(σ
′′
i , τ−i).
Theorem 3.13: The following are equivalent:
(a) ~σ ∈ NSD∞(Γ);
(b) ~σ is minimax rationalizable in Γ;
(c) there exists a finite counterfactual structure M that is strongly appropriate
for Γ and a state ω such that (M,ω) |= play(~σ)∧ni=1SRAT ki for all k ≥ 0;
(d) for all players i, there exists a finite counterfactual structure M that is ap-
propriate for Γ and a state ω such that (M,ω) |= play i(σi) ∧ SRAT ki for
all k ≥ 0.
Proof: We prove that (a) implies (b) implies (c) implies (d) implies (a). We first in-
troduce some helpful notation. Recall that argmaxx f(x) = {y : for all z, f(z) ≤
f(y)}; argminx f(x) is defined similarly. For us, x ranges over pure strategies or
pure strategy profiles, and we will typically be interested in considering some ele-
ment of the set, rather than the whole set. Which element we take does not matter.
We thus assume that there is some order on the set of pure strategies and strategy
profiles, and take the argmax∗x f(x) to be the maximum element of argmaxx f(x)
with respect to this order; argmin∗x f(x) is defined similarly.
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(a) ⇒ (b): Let K be an integer such that NSDK(Γ) = NSDK+1(Γ); such a K
must exist since the game is finite. It also easily follows that for each player j,
NSDKj (Γ) is non-empty: in iteration k + 1, no NSDkj -maximin strategy, that is,
no strategy in argmaxσ′j∈NSDkj (Γ)minτ−j∈NSDkj (Γ) uj(σ
′
j , τ−j), is deleted, since
no maximin strategy is minimax dominated by a strategy in NSDkj (Γ) (recall that
by Remark 3.10, it suffices to consider domination by strategies in NSDkj (Γ)).
Let Z ′j = NSD
K
j (Γ). It immediately follows that the sets Z ′1, . . . ,Z ′n satisfy the
conditions of Definition 3.12.
(b) ⇒ (c): Suppose that ~σ is minimax rationalizable. Let Z1, . . . ,Zn be the sets
guaranteed to exist by Definition 3.12. Let W i = {(~σ, i) | ~σ ∈ Z−i × Σi}, and
let W0 = {(~σ, 0) | ~σ ∈ Z1 × . . . × Zn}. Think of W0 as states where everyone
is (higher-level) rational, and of W i as “counterfactual” states where player i has
changed strategies. In states in W0, each player j assigns probability 1 to the other
players choosing actions that maximize j’s utility (given his action). On the other
hand, in states in W i, where i 6= 0, player i assigns probability 1 to the other
players choosing actions that minimize i’s utility, whereas all other player j 6= i
still assign probability 1 to other players choosing actions that maximize j’s utility.
Define a structure M = (Ω, f, s,PR1, . . . ,PRn), where
• Ω = ∪i∈{0,1,...,n}W
i;
• s(~σ′, i) = ~σ′;
• PRj(~σ
′, i)(~σ′′, i′) =


1 if i = j = i′, σ′i = σ′′i , and σ′′−i = argmin∗τ−i∈Z−i uj(σ
′
i, τ−i),
1 if i 6= j, i′ = 0, and σ′j = σ′′j , and σ′′−j = argmax∗τ−j∈Z−j uj(σ
′
j , τ−j),
0 otherwise;
• f((~σ′, i), j, σ′′j ) =
{
(~σ′, i) if σ′j = σ′′j ,
((σ′′j , τ
′
−j), j) otherwise, where τ ′−j = argmin∗τ−j∈Z−j uj(σ
′
j, τ−j).
It follows by inspection that M is strongly appropriate for Γ. We now prove by
induction on k that, for all k ≥ 1 all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, and all states ω ∈ W i,
(M,ω) |= ∧j 6=iSRAT
k
j .
For the base case (k = 1), since SRAT 1j is logically equivalent to RAT j ,
we must show that if ω ∈ W i, then (M,ω) |= ∧j 6=iRAT j . Suppose that ω =
(~σ′, i) ∈ W i. If i 6= j, then at ω, player j places probability 1 on the true state
being ω′ = (~σ′′, 0), where σ′′j = σ′j and σ′′−j = argmax∗τ−j∈Z−j uj(σ
′
j, τ−j).
Player j must be rational, since if there exists some strategy τ ′j such that uj(~σ′′) <∑
ω′∈Ω PR
c
j,τ ′j
(ω)(ω′)uj(τ
′
j , s−j(ω
′)), then the definition of PRj guarantees that
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uj(~σ
′′) < uj(τ
′
j , ~τ
′′
−j), where τ ′′j = argmin∗τ−j∈Z−j uj(σ
′
j , τ−j). If this inequality
held, then τ ′j would minimax dominate σ′j , contradicting the assumption that σ′j ∈
Zj . For the induction step, suppose that the result holds for k; we show that it
holds for k + 1. Suppose that ω ∈ W i and j 6= i. By construction, the support of
PRj(ω) is a subset of W0; by the induction hypothesis, it follows that (M,ω) |=
Bj(∧
n
j′=1SRAT
k
j′). Moreover, by construction, it follows that for all players j and
all strategies σ′j 6= si(ω), the support of PRcj,σ′j(ω) is a subset of W
j
. By the
induction hypothesis, it follows that for all j 6= i, (M,ω) |= B∗j (∧j′ 6=jSRAT kj′).
Finally, it follows from the induction hypothesis that for all j 6= i, (M,ω) |=
SRAT kj . Since SRAT kj implies RAT j , it follows that for all j 6= i, (M,ω) |=
RAT j ∧B
∗
j (∧j′ 6=jSRAT
k
j′), which proves the induction step.
(c) ⇒ (d): The implication is trivial.
(d) ⇒ (a): We prove an even stronger statement: For all k ≥ 0, if there exists
a finite counterfactual structure Mk that is appropriate for Γ and a state ω such
that (Mk, ω) |= play i(σi) ∧ SRAT ki , then σi ∈ NSDki (Γ).6 We proceed by
induction on k. The result clearly holds if k = 0. Suppose that the result holds
for k − 1 for k ≥ 1; we show that it holds for k. Let Mk = (Ω, f, s,P1, . . . ,Pn)
be a finite counterfactual structure that is appropriate for Γ and a state ω such that
(Mk, ω′) |= play i(σi)∧SRAT
k
i . Replacing SRAT ki by its definition, we get that
(Mk, ω′) |= play i(σi) ∧ RAT i ∧B
∗
i (∧j 6=iSRAT
k−1
j ).
By definition of B∗i , it follows that for all strategies σ′i for player i and all ω′′ such
that PRci,σ′i(ω
′)(ω′′) > 0,
(Mk, ω′′) |= ∧j 6=iSRAT
k−1
j ,
so by the induction hypothesis, it follows that for all ω′′ such thatPRci,σ′i(ω
′)(ω′′) >
0, we have s−i(ω′′) ∈ NSDk−1−i (Γ). Since (Mk, ω′) |= play i(σi) ∧ RAT i, it fol-
lows that σi cannot be minimax dominated with respect to NSDk−1−i (Γ). Since, for
all j′ > 1, NSDj
′
−i(Γ) ⊆ NSD
j′−1
−i (Γ), it follows that, for all k′ < k, σi is not
minimax dominated with respect to NSDk′−i(Γ). Thus, σi ∈ NSDki (Γ).
6The converse also holds; we omit the details.
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4 Characterizing Analogues of Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we consider analogues of Nash equilibrium in our setting. This
allows us to relate our approach to the work of Tennenholtz [2004] and Kalai et
al. [2010]. In the standard setting, if a strategy profile ~σ is a Nash equilibrium,
then there exists a state where ~σ is played, common belief of rationality holds, and
additionally, the strategy profile is (commonly) known to the players. To study ana-
logues of Nash equilibrium, we thus investigate the effect of adding assumptions
about knowledge of the players’ strategies.
We consider several ways of formalizing this. The weakest approach is to
simply require that the actual strategies used by the players is known.
• (M,ω) |= KS iff, for all players i,
PRi(ω)([[s−i(ω)]]M ) = 1.
KS does not require that player i knows how players −i will respond to i switching
strategies. A stronger condition would be to require not only that every player i
knows the strategies of the other players, but also how they respond to i switching
strategies.
• (M,ω) |= KR iff, for all players i and strategies σ′i for i,
PRci,σ′
i
(ω)([[s−i(f(ω, i, σ
′
i))]]M ) = 1.
Clearly, KR implies KS (by simply considering σ′i = si(ω)). An even stronger
condition is to require that the players know the true state of the world.
• (M,ω) |= KW iff, for all players i,
PRi(ω)(ω) = 1.
Note that if all players know the true state of the world, then they also counterfac-
tually know the true state of the world: for every player i and every strategy σ′i for
player i,
PRci,σ′i
(ω)(f(ω, i, σ′i)) = 1.
It follows that KW implies KR and thus also KS. Additionally, note that KW
implies EB(KW), so KW also implies CB(KW).
We now characterize CCBR in structures satisfying the conditions above. We
say that a strategy profile ~σ is individually rational (IR) if for every player i in the
game Γ,
ui(~σ) ≥ max
σ′i∈Σi(Γ)
min
τ−i∈Σ−i(Γ)
ui(σ
′, τ−i).
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Although every IR strategy profile is contained in NSD1(Γ), it is not necessar-
ily contained in NSD2(Γ). That is, IR strategies may not survive two rounds of
deletion of minimax dominated strategies. To see this, consider the game Γ in
Example 3.11. Both players’ maximin payoff is 1.5, so every strategy profile in
NSD1(Γ) = {(x, y) | 2 ≤ x, y ≤ k} is IR, but NSD2(Γ) does not contain (2, 2).
As the following simple example shows, not every strategy profile that survives
deletion iterated deletion of minimax dominated strategies is IR.
Example 4.1: Consider the game with payoffs given in the table below.
c d
a (100, 0) (100, 0)
b (150, 0) (50, 0)
All strategy profiles survive iterated deletion of minimax dominated strategies, but
(b, d) is not individually rational since playing a always guarantees the row player
utility 100.
Let IR(Γ) denote the set of IR strategy profiles in Γ, and let IR(Z1 × . . . ×
Zn,Γ) = IR(Γ
′) where Γ′ is the subgame of Γ obtained by restricting player i’s
strategy set to Zi. That is, IR(Z1 × . . . × Zn,Γ) is the set of strategies ~σ ∈
Z1 × . . .×Zn such that for every player i,
ui(~σ) ≥ max
σ′i∈Zi
min
τ−i∈Z−i
ui(σ
′, τ−i).
A stronger way of capturing individual rationality of subgames is to require that the
condition above hold even if the max is taken over every σ′i ∈ Σ(Γ) (as opposed to
only σ′i ∈ Zi). More precisely, let IR′(Z1 × . . . × Zn,Γ) be the set of strategies
~σ ∈ Z1 × . . .×Zn such that, for all players i,
ui(~σ) ≥ max
σ′i∈Σi(Γ)
min
τ−i∈Z−i
ui(σ
′, τ−i).
Our characterization of CCBR in the presence of (common) knowledge of
strategies follows.
Theorem 4.2: The following are equivalent:
(a) ~σ ∈ IR(NSD∞(Γ),Γ);
(b) ~σ ∈ IR′(NSD∞(Γ),Γ);
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(c) ~σ is minimax rationalizable and ~σ ∈ IR′(Z1×. . .×Zn,Γ), whereZ1, . . . ,Zn
are the sets of strategies guaranteed to exists by the definition of minimax ra-
tionalizability;
(d) there exists a finite counterfactual structure M that is strongly appropriate
for Γ and a state ω such that (M,ω) |= KW ∧ play(~σ) ∧ni=1 SRAT ki for
every k ≥ 0;
(e) there exists a finite counterfactual structure M that is appropriate for Γ and
a state ω such that (M,ω) |= KS ∧ play(~σ) ∧ni=1 SRAT ki for every k ≥ 0.
Proof: Again, we prove that (a) implies (b) implies (c) implies (d) implies (e)
implies (a).
(a) ⇒ (b): We show that if ~σ ∈ IR(NSDk(Γ),Γ) then ~σ ∈ IR′(NSDk(Γ),Γ).
The implication then follows from the fact that since the game is finite there exists
some K such that NSDK(Γ) = NSD∞(Γ).
Assume by way of contradiction that ~σ ∈ IR(NSDk(Γ),Γ) but ~σ /∈ IR′(NSDk(Γ),Γ);
that is, there exists a player i and a strategy σ′i /∈ NSDki (Γ) such that
min
τ−i∈NSD
k
−i(Γ)
ui(σ
′
i, τ−i) > ui(~σ).
By the argument in Remark 3.10, there exists a strategy σ′′i ∈ NSDki (Γ) such that
ui(σ
′′
i , τ
′′
−i) > ui(σ
′
i, τ
′
−i) for all τ ′′−i, τ ′−i ∈ NSDk−i(Γ). It follows that
min
τ−i∈NSD
k
−i(Γ)
ui(σ
′′
i , τ−i) > ui(~σ).
Thus, ~σ /∈ IR(NSDk(Γ),Γ).
(b) ⇒ (c): The implication follows in exactly the same way as in the proof that
(a) implies (b) in Theorem 3.13.
(c) ⇒ (d): Suppose that ~σ is minimax rationalizable. Let Z1, . . . ,Zn be the sets
guaranteed to exist by Definition 3.12, and suppose that ~σ ∈ IR′(Z1×Zn,Γ). De-
fine the sets W i as in the proof of Theorem 3.13. Define the structure M just as in
the proof of Theorem 3.13, except that for all players i, let PRi((~σ, 0))((~σ′, i′)) =
1 in case ~σ′ = ~σ and i′ = 0. Clearly (M, (~σ, 0)) |= KW. It follows using the same
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.13 that M is strongly appropriate and that
(M, (~σ, 0) |= play(~σ) ∧ni=1 SRAT
k
i for every k ≥ 0; we just need to rely on the
(strong) IR property of ~σ to prove the base case of the induction.
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(d) ⇒ (e): The implication is trivial.
(e) ⇒ (a): Recall that since the game is finite, there exists a constant K such
that NSDK−1(Γ) = NSDK(Γ) = NSD∞(Γ). We show that if there exists a
finite counterfactual structure M that is appropriate for Γ and a state ω such that
(M,ω) |= KS ∧ play(~σ) ∧ni=1 SRAT
K
i , then ~σ ∈ IR(NSDK(Γ),Γ).
Consider some state ω such that (M,ω) |= KS ∧ play(~σ) ∧ni=1 SRATKi . By
Theorem 3.13, it follows that ~σ ∈ NSDK(Γ). For each player i, it additionally
follows that (M,ω) |= play(~σ) ∧EB(play(~σ)) ∧RAT i ∧B∗i (∧j 6=iSRAT
K−1
j ).
By Theorem 3.13, it follows that for every strategy σ′i for i, the support of the pro-
jection of PRci,σ′i(ω) onto strategies for players −i is a subset of NSD
K−1
−i (Γ) =
NSDK−i(Γ). Thus, we have that for every σ′i, there exists τ−i ∈ NSDK−i(Γ) such
that ui(~σ) ≥ ui(σ′i, τ−i), which means that ~σ is IR in the subgame induced by
restricting the strategy set to NSDK(Γ).
It is worth comparing Theorem 4.2 to the results of Tennenholtz [2004] and
Kalai et al. [2010] on program equilibria/equilibria with conditional commitments.
Recall that these papers focus on 2-player games. In Tennenholtz’s model, each
player i deterministically picks a program Πi; player i’s action is Πi(Π−i). In
the two-player case, a program equilibrium is a pair of programs (Π1,Π2) such
that no player can improve its utility by unilaterally changing its program. In this
model any IR strategy profile (a1, a2) can be sustained in a program equilibrium:
each player uses the program Π, where Π(Π′) outputs ai if Π′ = Π, and other-
wise “punishes” the other player using his minmax strategy. (Tennenholtz extends
this result to show that any mixed IR strategy profile can be sustained in a pro-
gram equilibrium, by considering randomizing programs; Kalai et al. show that all
correlated IR strategy profiles can be sustained, by allowing the players to pick a
distribution over programs.) In contrast, in our model, a smaller set of strategy
profiles can be sustained. This difference can be explained as follows. In the pro-
gram equilibrium model a player may “punish” the other player using an arbitrary
action (e.g., using minimax punishment) although this may be detrimental for him.
Common counterfactual belief of rationality disallows such punishments. More
precisely, it allows a player i to punish other players only by using a strategy that is
rational for player i. On the other hand, as we now show, if we require only com-
mon belief (as opposed to counterfactual belief) in rationality, then any IR strategy
can be sustained in an equilibrium in our model.
Theorem 4.3: The following are equivalent:
(a) ~σ ∈ IR(Γ);
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(b) there exists a finite counterfactual structure M that is strongly appropriate
for Γ and a state ω such that (M,ω) |= KW ∧ play(~σ) ∧CB(RAT );
(c) there exists a finite counterfactual structure M that is appropriate for Γ and
a state ω such that (M,ω) |= KS ∧ play(~σ) ∧ CB(RAT ).
Proof: Again, we prove that (a) implies (b) implies (c) implies (a).
(a) ⇒ (b): Define a structure M = (Ω, f, s,PR1, . . . ,PRn), where
• Ω = Σ(Γ);
• s(~σ′) = ~σ′;
• PRj(~σ
′)(~σ′) = 1.
• f(~σ′, i, σ′′j ) =
{
~σ′ if σ′j = σ′′j ,
(σ′′j , τ
′
−j) otherwise, where τ ′−j = argmin∗τ−j∈Σ−j(Γ) uj(σ
′
j , τ−j).
It follows that M is strongly appropriate for Γ and that (M,~σ) |= KW. Moreover,
(M,~σ) |= RAT since ~σ is individually rational; furthermore, since each player
considers only the state ~σ possible at ~σ, it follows that (M,~σ) |= CB(RAT ).
(b) ⇒ (c): The implication is trivial.
(c) ⇒ (a): Suppose that M = (Ω, f, s,PR1, . . . ,PRn) is a finite counterfactual
structure appropriate for Γ, and (M,ω) |= KW∧play(~σ)∧CB(RAT ). It follows
that for each player i, (M,ω) |= play(~σ)∧EB(play(~σ))∧RAT i. Thus, we have
that for all strategies σ′i, there exists τ−i ∈ Σ−i(Γ) such that ui(~σ) ≥ ui(σ′i, τ−i),
which means that ~σ is IR.
5 Discussion
We have introduced a game-theoretic framework for analyzing scenarios where
a player may believe that if he were to switch strategies, this intention to switch
may be detected by the other players, resulting in them also switching strategies.
Our formal model allows players’ counterfactual beliefs (i.e., their beliefs about
the state of the world in the event that they switch strategies) to be arbitrary—they
may be completely different from the players’ actual beliefs.
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We may also consider a more restricted model where we require that a player
i’s counterfactual beliefs regarding other players’ strategies and beliefs is ǫ-close to
player i’s actual beliefs in total variation distance7—that is, for every state ω ∈ Ω,
player i, and strategy σ′i for player i, the projection of PRci,σ′i(ω) onto strategies
and beliefs of players −i is ǫ-close to the projection of PRi(ω) onto strategies and
beliefs of players −i.
We refer to counterfactual structures satisfying this property as ǫ-counterfactual
stuctures. Roughly speaking, ǫ-counterfactual structures restrict to scenarios where
players are not “too” transparent to one another; this captures the situation when
a player assigns only some “small” probability to its switch in action being no-
ticed by the other players. 0-counterfactual structures behave just as counterfactual
structures that respect unilateral deviations: common counterfactual belief of ra-
tionality in 0-counterfactual structures characterizes rationalizable strategies (see
Remark 3.5). The general counterfactual structures investigated in this paper are
1-counterfactual structures (that is, we do not impose any conditions on players’
counterfactual beliefs). We remark that although our characterization results rely
on the fact that we consider 1-counterfactual structures, the motivating example in
the introduction (the translucent prisoner’s dilemma game) shows that even consid-
ering ǫ-counterfactual structures with a small ǫ can result in there being strategies
consistent with common counterfactual belief of rationality that are not rational-
izable. We leave an exploration of common counterfactual belief of rationality in
ǫ-counterfactual structures for future work.
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